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ILLINOIS CONSTRUCTION NEGLIGENCE,
POST-STRUCTURAL WORK ACT: THE
NEED FOR A CLEAR LEGISLATIVE
MANDATE
PETER PUCHALSKI*

INTRODUCTION

From the casual passer-by to the architectural buff, the
grandiose edifice of a downtown skyscraper evokes feelings of awe
and marvel. However, little thought is ever given to the perils
encountered daily by those employed in the construction industry.
The statistics are telling. Since the early 1970's the construction
industry's incidence of injury has exceeded national rates by more
than sixty percent.1 Within the construction industry, death rates
for ironworkers, routinely involved in extra-hazardous activities,
are consistently higher then those for all other construction
The most common accident at construction sites is falls, and
more fatalities result from falls than any other construction
activity.3 Falls kill more than 300 construction workers every
year, and injure thousands others.4
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, The John Marshall Law School. Special thanks
to Ryan Liska and the entire John Marshall Law Review editorial staff.
Thanks also to my father, Dennis Puchalski, for his unparalleled insight into
Illinois construction negligence.
1. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Safer Construction Workplaces Evident
During the Early 1990s, at http://stats.bls.gov.iif/oshwc/ossm0004.txt (last
visited Feb. 28, 2003) (revealing the dangerous nature of the construction
industry compared to national rates encompassing all employment).
2. See Earl S. Pollack & Risana T. Chowdhury, Trends in Work-Related
Death and Injury Rates among U.S. Construction Workers, 1992-98, The
Center to Protect Workers' Rights, at http://www.cpwr.com/krdeaths.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2003) (detailing trends in national death and injury rates
within the construction industry, on an individual trade basis).
3. See William F. Conour, Construction Site Accident Facts, at
http://www.conour.com/facts.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2003) (compiling
statistics indicating the risk of injury and death associated with the
construction industry). This site further asserts that ironworkers are the
construction trade with the greatest likelihood of injury. Id.
4. See The Center to Protect Workers' Rights, Fall Protection Harnesses:
Hazard Alert, at http://www.cpwr.comhazfallprotection.pdf (last visited Feb.
28, 2003) (describing fall-protection equipment and procedure for the purpose
of lowering national death rates related to falls).
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On a national level, ironworker death and injury rates have
significantly declined from 1992 to 1998. 5 In Illinois, from 1995 to
1998, the number of construction related deaths has increased by
29 percent.6
Two conclusions are quite clear. First, it is evident that
construction safety is a serious concern that cannot be ignored on
either the state or federal level. Second, since 1995, Illinois has
not effectively regulated and ensured construction safety.
Until 1995, extra-hazardous construction activities in Illinois
were governed by the Illinois Structural Work Act. This Act was
extremely controversial and sparked serious debate between labor
organizations, political parties, insurance companies, contractors,
land owners, architects and workers alike.
This article discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses
of both the Illinois Structural Work Act and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 414, which is the current measure of liability
for construction-related injuries in Illinois.7 This article further
contends that the Illinois legislature must correct current
litigation problems and ambiguities-as well as increasing
construction injury and death rates-by issuing a clear legislative
mandate regarding such injuries. This article suggests that the
Illinois legislature revise the Structural Work Act to address the
Act's previous shortcomings, while providing a clear, reliable and
predicable standard upon which to base liability, assess damages,
and ensure workplace safety.
Part I explores the background and history of the Illinois
Structural Work Act from its inception in 1907, through 1995
when the Illinois legislature repealed it, while chronicling other
relevant developments in Illinois tort law. Part II illustrates the
operation of the Illinois Structural Work Act and Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 414 as construction negligence standards,
assessing their efficiency and utility by exploring litigation arising
under each measure. Finally, Part III addresses the specific need
5. See generally Pollack & Chowdhury, supra note 2 (revealing overall

trends in ironworker injury and death rates). Nonfatal injuries to ironworkers
dropped from roughly 1,800 injuries per 10,000 workers in 1992 to roughly 800
injuries per 10,000 workers in 1998.
Id.
Work-related deaths among
ironworkers dropped from roughly 150 deaths per 100,000 workers in 1992 to
under 100 deaths per 100,000 workers in 1998. Id.
6. Martin
F.
Healy,
Vested
Interest,
at
www.iltla.com/
octoberl998vested.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2003) (describing the alarming
raise in construction-related deaths in Illinois since the repeal of the Illinois
Structural Work Act in 1995 through 1998).
7. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965) (stating
the standard for negligence in exercising control retained by the employer).
See generally Bruce M. Kohen & Darius H. Bozorgi, Construction Negligence:
Out from the Shadow of the Structural Work Act, 87 ILL. B.J. 34 (1999)
(discussing construction
negligence
standards
as reflected
in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and the Structural Work Act).
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for a clear legislative mandate and further proposes
compromised approach to construction negligence standards.
I.

a

BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE ILLINOIS
STRUCTURAL WORK ACT AND OTHER RELEVANT LEGISLATION

Part A of this section discusses the historical roots of the
Illinois Structural Work Act. Part B reveals the elements of a
cause of action under the Act. Part C discusses the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act and its relationship to the Illinois
Structural Work Act. Part D approaches the application of
comparative negligence and contribution to the Illinois Structural
Work Act. In Part E, common law negligence principles relating to
construction injuries are defined and discussed. Finally, Part F
details the repeal of the Illinois Structural Work Act.
A. Illinois Structural Work Act: A HistoricalPerspective
On June 3, 1907,8 the Illinois legislature passed the
Structural Work Act,9 also known as the "Scaffold Act," for the
purpose of ensuring workplace safety for construction workers
engaged in extra-hazardous activities.'0 Although no recorded
legislative history of the Structural Work Act exists, a historical
perspective of the times in which it was enacted provides ample
insight into the circumstances surrounding the Act's creation." At
the turn of the century, America's industrial strength was
reaching unprecedented heights.12 Accompanying this ascension
was an alarming rate of workplace injuries.1"
The Illinois

8. 1907 ILL. LAWS 312.

9. Structural Work Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1-9 (1994) (repealed
1995) [hereinafter Act].
10. Id. The Illinois Structural Work Act requires that all scaffolds, hoists,
cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, used for the
erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any structure be created
and maintained in a safe, suitable and proper manner. Id. at § 1.
11. See Gannon v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pac. Ry. Co., 175 N.E.2d
785, 791-792 (Ill. 1961) (explaining the legal climate under which the Illinois
Structural Work Act was passed in 1907). Prior to the Structural Work Act, a
person "in charge" of the work was required to use ordinary care to protect his
workers. Id. at 791. However, a defendant in a negligence action was shielded
by the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow
servant rule, all of which created an extremely difficult litigation barrier for
any plaintiff to overcome. Id. For example, prior to the Structural Work Act,
a plaintiffs own negligence would not offset his recovery, but would serve as a
complete bar to his action. See id. (providing an example where plaintiffs
negligence would serve to bar any recovery for injuries).
12. See generally ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW § 2.07 (Matthew Bender ed., 2002) (describing the rising

industrial climate in the United States that lead to widespread legislative
reform, in particular the Workmen's Compensation Act).
13. Id. at § 2.07, 2-13. Larson attributes the birth of the Workmen's
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legislature established Illinois' first Workers' Compensation Act,
along with the Structural Work Act, to provide workers with an
However, the
adequate remedy for workplace injuries.14
legislature required the plaintiff to have sufficiently proven each
element of the cause of action before the Structural Work Act
entitled him to the provided remedies."
B. Illinois Structural Work Act: Elements of a Cause of Action
To recover the civil remedy established by the Structural
Work Act, an injured party had to prove that he/she belonged to
cover.
the protected class that legislature intended the Act to
16

Compensation Act in the United States to "the coincidence of increasing
industrial injuries and decreasing remedies." Id.
14. See Gannon, 175 N.E.2d at 792 (explaining the legislative purpose
behind the passage of the Structural Work Act). The Gannon court concluded
that the purpose of the Act was to ensure adequate compensation to the
injured worker and prevent future worksite injuries. Id. at 791-92. Further,
the court reasoned that the doctrines of comparative negligence and
assumption of risk were not applied to the Act so that a plaintiffs own
negligence would not prove fatal to his own cause of action, as it commonly did
prior to the Act's inception. Id. at 792. Moreover, the court likened this
feature of the Structural Work Act to the Mining Act that had been passed
prior to the Structural Work Act and similarly construed. Id. See also
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 12, at § 2.07, 2-13 (explaining the rise in
Workmen's Compensation Acts throughout the country in the early 1900s).
Larson attributes the vast increase in legislative action throughout the
country concerning workmen's compensation to "the coincidence of increasing
industrial strength and decreasing remedies." Id. Larson further asserts that
Illinois, along with Massachusetts and Connecticut, were the leaders among
the states in implementing an initiative of reform. Id. See also History of
at
Law,
Compensation
Workers'
http://www.workerscompensation.com/illinois/reference/qfacts/qfacts0l.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2003) (tracing the history of the Illinois Workers'
Compensation Act from its inception to its current status, detailing each
amendment to the Act).
15. See generally 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150 /1-9 (1994) (repealed 1995).
16. See Vuletich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 512 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ill. 1987)
(holding that, as a general rule, the Structural Work Act does not cover all
construction-related accidents). But see Lafata v. Vill. of Lisle, 561 N.E.2d 38,
42 (Ill. 1990) (stating that Illinois courts have routinely construed the
provisions of the Structural Work Act liberally so as to provide adequate
protection to workers engaged in extra-hazardous work activities). The Lafata
court extended coverage to the plaintiff because his work activity was
particularly hazardous, although the plaintiffs injury did not involve a
scaffold, crane, stay, ladder, support or other mechanical contrivance as
section 1 of the Structural Work Act expressly requires. Id. at 43. Compare
Quinn v. L.B.C., Inc., 418 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (Ill. 1981) (holding that a city
building inspector, uninvolved with the erection of a structure was covered
under the Act). The Quinn court reasoned that the plaintiff should be covered
under the Act because his activities bore a legitimate connection to the
workplace. Id. at 1013. See also Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank,
289 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ill. 1972) (holding that the activities of a professional
window washer were covered under the Structural Work Act, although the act
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Next, the injured party had to establish that the defendant owed
him/her a duty of reasonable care. 7 Under the Structural Work
Act, the injured party could allege the existence of a duty on the
part of owners, contractors, sub-contractors, architects or any
other third person "having charge of the erection, construction,
repairing, alteration, removal, or painting of any building, bridge,
viaduct or other structure within the provisions of this Act." 18
Finally, an injured party had to prove a "willful" failure to comply
with the provisions of the Act." In the event of death, the civil
cause of action was available to a surviving spouse, lineal heirs,
adopted children, or anyone dependent upon the decedent.2 '
Moreover, violations of the Structural Work Act could lead to
of "cleaning" was not expressly addressed in section 1 of the Act). But see
Grant v. Zale Const. Co., 440 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (Ill. 1982) (holding that the
activities of a firefighter, injured while providing medical assistance to a
construction worker fell outside of the protected class). The Grant court
reasoned that a firefighter has no direct connection with the construction
process. Id. at 1045. See generally Scott Owen Reed, The Protected Class
Under the Structural Work Act, 74 ILL. B.J. 186, 188 (1985) (examining the
controversy behind the "protected class" recognized under the Illinois
Structural Work Act). The "protected class" of the Structural Work Act has
been interpreted both liberally and narrowly throughout Illinois courts. Id.
For those not explicitly engaged in extra-hazardous activities, Illinois courts
do agree that the activities in question must directly aid or further
construction activities described in section 1 of the Illinois Structural Work.
Id. at 187. See generally William H. Angler, Liabilitiesof an Owner Under the
Scaffold Act - The Statute's "Having Charge of' Language Produces
Inconsistency - Norton v. Waggoner Equipment Rental & Excavating Co., 29
DEPAUL L. REv. 635 (1980) (explaining that there have been inconsistent
results applying liability under the Scaffold Act).
17. Cockrum v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 917, 921-22 (Ill. 1995).
18. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/9 (1994) (repealed 1995).
19. Id. See also Cockrum, 645 N.E.2d at 921-22 (holding that under the
Illinois Structural Work Act, a "willful" violation is one in which the party
"having charge of' the work knew, or through the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known, that a dangerous condition existed); Davis v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 336 N.E.2d 881, 885 (Ill. 1975) (equating the
"willful" requirement under the Structural Work Act to "knowing"). But see
Arlen v. United States, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13298, at 14 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(holding that a defendant can violate the Illinois Structural Work Act despite
a lack of knowledge that the plaintiff would even be present at the worksite);
Smith v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 531 N.E.2d 51, 57-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that a defendant cannot commit a willful violation where the
dangerous condition is of such recent creation and short duration that he could
not have reasonably discovered it); Getz v. Del E. Webb Corp., 349 N.E.2d 682,
687-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (holding that a defendant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law when the plaintiff can not provide sufficient evidence of
whether the defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous
condition). This occurs when there is sufficient evidence establishing the fact
that the condition existed prior to the plaintiffs injury and that the defendant,
through the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered its existence.
Cockrum, 645 N.E.2d at 922.
20. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/9 (1994) (repealed 1995).
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criminal sanctions, carrying the penalty of a Class A
misdemeanor." The importance of construction safety-evident in
both the civil and criminal penalties established under the
Structural Work Act-was reinforced by the Illinois legislature
with the enactment of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.
C. Illinois Workers' CompensationAct
Four years after the enactment of the Structural Work Act,
the Illinois legislature passed the first form of the Illinois Workers'
By 1917, Illinois legislation limited the
Compensation Act. 2
remedies of those injured in the course of extra-hazardous
activities to the guaranteed disability payments provided by the
Workers' Compensation Act.23 Then, in 1952, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the surrender clause of the Workers'
Compensation Act, section 29, which eliminated all private causes
was
non-employers,
third-party
against
action
of
unconstitutional. 24 As a result, Structural Work Act cases began to
flourish, as an injured party was now able to sue any negligent
party, with the exception of their immediate employer." The
current Workers' Compensation Act in Illinois still precludes an
injured employee from seeking a private cause of action against

21. Id. The State is authorized, largely through the State's Attorney, but
also through any other attorney, to ensure compliance through necessary legal
action. Id.
22. Workers' Compensation Act, 1911 ILL. LAwS 314 (codified as amended
820 Ill. Comp Stat 305/1-30 (Supp. 2001)). Historians attribute the Act's birth
as a response to increasing work fatalities, in particular the Cherry Mine
Disaster. See generally Rina Merli, Cherry Mine Disaster, ILLINOIS HISTORY,
April 1973, at 158. In November of 1909, over 200 men died in a tragic mine
fire in Cherry, Illinois sparking national attention and encouraging local
legislative initiative. Id.
23. Workers' Compensation Act, 1911 ILL. LAWS 314 (codified as amended
820 Ill. Comp Stat 305/1-30 (Supp. 2001)). See Gannon, 175 N.E.2d at 792
(explaining the effect of section 29 of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act
Section 29 of the Workers'
upon Structural Work Act litigation).
Compensation Act barred all actions against third-party tortfeasors, resulting
in the "limited recourse to the Scaffold Act in the ensuing years." Id.
24. Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 106 N.E.2d 124, 135-36 (Ill. 1952)
(holding that the surrender clause, section 29, of the Workers' Compensation
Act violated the equal protection clause of both the federal and state
constitution). Follwing Grasse, an injured worker's recovery was no longer
limited to the guaranteed Workers' Compensation payments. Id. at 135-36.
This ruling gave new life to the Illinois Structural Work Act, allowing an
injured party to maintain a private cause of action against a non-employer
third party despite the guaranteed payment from his immediate employer. Id.
at 135-36. See also Gannon, 175 N.E.2d at 792 (suggesting that the Illinois
Supreme Court's finding of unconstitutionality concerning section 29 of the
Workers' Compensation Act led to a revival in Scaffold Act cases throughout
Illinois).
25. Gannon, 175 N.E.2d at 792.
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his/her own employer." Two further developments in Illinois law
that collided with the operation of the Structural Work Act were
the doctrines of comparative negligence and contribution.
D. Comparative Negligence and Contribution
Throughout the history of the Structural Work Act, several
important tort developments occurred in Illinois. Prior to 1981,
Illinois endorsed the doctrine of contributory negligence, which
barred a plaintiffs recovery in an Illinois negligence action if that
plaintiff was even one percent negligent. 7 In 1977, Illinois showed
signs of departure from a contributory negligence system. First,
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of contribution 28
in joint tortfeasor cases, allowing a tortfeasor to recover a
proportionate share from others jointly responsible for the same
tort. 9 Then, in the 1981 decision of Alvis v. Ribar, ° the Illinois
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of comparative negligence, 1
citing inequitable results under the previous system of

26. Workers' Compensation Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 305/5(a) (Supp.
2001); Stewart v. Jones, 742 N.E.2d 896, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (stating that
an employee has no right to recover damages from his/her immediate
employer for workplace injuries, other than the compensation guaranteed by
the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act). A claimant under the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act is entitled to three benefits. First, the claimant
receives temporary total disability checks ("TTD" or "disability") for the time
that that claimant is restricted from returning to work by a medical
professional and actively seeking medical care. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
305/8(b) (Supp. 2001). Next, all reasonable and necessary medical bills,
directly related to the claimant's work accident, are submitted to and covered
by the workers' compensation insurance carrier of that claimant's employer.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 305/8(a) (Supp. 2001). Finally, the claimant is entitled
to a lump sum settlement; calculated according to that claimant's injury
according to permanent partial disability ("PPD") rates, permanent total
disability ("PTD") rates or a wage loss differential. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
305/9 (Supp. 2001).
27. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 330 (7th ed. 1999) (defining contributory-

negligence doctrine as "[t]he principle that completely bars a plaintiffs
recovery if the damage suffered is partly the plaintiffs own fault").
28. See WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 496 (16th ed.

1981) (defining contribution as "a payment of an individual's share in a loss for
which several are jointly liable.").
29. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437,
442 (Ill. 1977) (opining that no compelling reason existed in favor of the
continued use of the no-contribution rule). See also DEAN PROSSER, TORTS §
50, 307 (4th ed. 1971) (stating that "[t]here is obvious lack of sense and justice
in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants
were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone").
30. 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981).
31. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 276 (defining the Comparative
Negligence Doctrine as "[tihe principle that reduces a plaintiffs recovery
proportionally to the plaintiffs degree of fault in causing the damage, rather
than barring recovery completely.").
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contributory negligence."2 The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Alvis foreshadowed an encounter between the principles of
comparative negligence and the Illinois Structural Work Act,
where a plaintiffs own negligence was not a limiting factor in that
plaintiffs tort recovery. By 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court
settled this dispute through its decision in Simmons v. Union
Electric Co.33 There the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
application of comparative negligence to Illinois Structural Work
Act cases.34 The Illinois Supreme Court specifically held that:
Because the Act continues to present an exception to the presently
prevailing common law principle that an injured person seeking
recovery should be penalized to the extent of his own negligence, we
hold that comparative negligence does not apply to the conduct of a
workman who is eligible to rely upon this Act. Instead, the sole
inquiry under the Act is an assessment
of the defendant's
3
culpability and not the plaintiffs conduct.

5

This ruling-eliminating
the defense of comparative
negligence and assumption of risk-remained controlling
throughout the operation of the Illinois Structural Work Act.

32. Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 896-97. The court held that negligence actions
would no longer be decided under the common law doctrine of contributory
negligence. Id. The court decided to apply the doctrine of comparative
negligence, rather than continuing to apply the concept of comparative
negligence. Id. at 897. This change was implemented to keep Illinois up with
the tort developments already endorsed by a majority of the states. Id. at 896.
Moreover, the court reasoned that it was inequitable to "ignore the plight of
the plaintiff who, because of some negligence on their part, are forced to bear
the entire burden of their injuries." Id. See also Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc.,
454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983) (extending the doctrine of comparative
negligence to a cause of action sounding in strict liability); Skinner, 374
N.E.2d at 442 (applying the theory of comparative fault in recognizing a
contribution claim between two joint tortfeasors, without overruling the old
doctrine of contributory negligence). Due to these seminal Illinois Supreme
Court cases, a clash between the theories of contribution and comparative
negligence-both critical tort reforms-with the Structural Work Act became
inevitable.
33. 473 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. 1984).
34. Simmons, 473 N.E.2d at 953.
35. Id. In reaching its decision to reject the application of the doctrine of
comparative negligence to the Structural Work Act, the Illinois Supreme
Court cited the importance of the rules of statutory construction stating, "[wle
must apply the legal axiom that the words of a statute should be construed to
give effect to the legislative intention, which must be ascertained not only
from the language of the entire act, but from the evil to be remedied and the
object to be attained." Id. at 954. Thus, the Simmons court denied the
applicability of comparative negligence to maintain the legislative intent of
protecting the workman engaged in extra-hazardous activities from unsafe
working conditions. Id. See generally Andrew M. Gardner, Comparative Fault
and the Structural Work Act: Simmons v. Union Electric Company, 35 DEPAUL
L. REV. 207 (1985).
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E. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414
Common law negligence principles, articulated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 414, co-existed with the
Illinois Structural Work Act as a separate measure of liability in
construction-related injuries.36 Section 414, fixing liability upon
those who "retain control" of work entrusted to independent
contractors, was first recognized as valid Illinois law in 1965, with
the decision of Larson v. Commonwealth Edison, Co.37 In order to
state a cause of action for common law negligence, the plaintiff
must allege the existence of a duty, the breach of that duty, and a
compensable injury proximately caused by that breach.38 An
important difference between the Illinois Structural Work Act and
section 414 appears to have been the role of comparative
negligence; as a plaintiff proceeding under the Structural Work
Act would not have his tort recovery apportioned by his own
negligence.39 However, under section 414, a plaintiffs recovery is
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965) (defining the
liability attending to construction-related injuries). The section in pertinent
part states that:
[o]ne who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains
the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical
injury to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise
reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control
with reasonable care.
Id. Much like the Illinois Structural Work Act, and its "having control of'
clause, section 414 litigation largely seems to rest upon interpretation of the
"retained control" clause. Section 414 provides commentary on the retained
control clause:
Itihe employer must have retained at least some degree of control over
the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has
merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect
its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or
recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe
alterations or deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to
employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to
his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be some
retention of a right to supervise that the contractor is not entirely free to
do the work in his own way.
Id. at comment (c).
37. Larson, 211 N.E.2d at 252. The court held that the retention of the
right to control the work of a subcontractor was sufficient to subject one to
duty and tort responsibility. Id.
38. Rogers v. West Constr. Co., 623 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). A
common law negligence action in Illinois, proceeding under section 414 is
determined under the following well-recognized rules: "The employer of an
independent contractor is not liable for the acts or omissions of the
independent contractor." Bokodi v. Foster Wheeler Robbins, Inc., 728 N.E.2d
726, 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). However, an employer who retains control over
any part of the work will be liable for all injuries proximately caused from his
subsequent failure to exercise his right of control with reasonable care. Id. at
732.
39. See Simmons, 473 N.E.2d at 953 (rejecting the availability of the
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offset by his/her own level of negligence." Moreover, if a plaintiffs
own negligence is found to be greater than fifty percent of the
proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff cannot recover any
damages under Illinois law.4'
F. Structural Work Act Repeal
In 1995, the Illinois legislature repealed the Structural Work
Act. 2 Since its repeal, section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of
measure of liability for
Torts has become the primary
construction-related injuries in Illinois. 3
defense of comparative negligence to Illinois Structural Work Act cases).
40. See Haberer v. Vill. of Sauget, 511 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that a plaintiffs actual knowledge of a danger will not defeat his
claim). It is only relevant "whether the owner's obligation to pay damages
should be reduced based on principles of comparative negligence." Id.
41. Limitation on Recovery in Tort Actions; Fault, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/2-1116(c) (1986).
42. H.B. 30, 82d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1995). Despite a repeal date
of February 14, 1995, construction-related personal injury suits are still being
tried today in Illinois courts under the provisions of the old Structural Work
Act. See Atkins v. Deere & Co., 685 N.E.2d 342, 347-48 (Ill. 1997) (holding
that the repeal of the Structural Work Act did not serve as a bar to those
causes of action that had accrued prior to the repeal date). In Atkins, the
Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the preamble of Pub. Act 89-2, resolving
the issue of whether the repeal was unconditional. Id. First, the court
reasoned that there was a presumption of retroactive application, which could
only be rebutted by contrary legislative intent. Id. at 347. Next, the Illinois
Supreme Court found that the body of the text for Public Act 89-2 failed to
indicate whether it was to be applied prospectively or retroactively. Id.
However, the court held that the legislative intent found only in the preamble
was sufficient enough to rebut the presumption of retroactive application. Id.
Thus, those causes of action accruing prior to the repeal date created a "vested
right" in the plaintiff to pursue his suit under the defunct Structural Work
Act. Id. at 348. See also Debra Chesnin, Court Catches Ball Legislature
Dropped When Repealing Structural Work Act, 85 ILL. B.J. 620, 620-26 (1997)
(explaining how the Illinois Supreme Court corrected legislation deficiencies).
Chesnin suggests that the Illinois Supreme Court "bailed out" the Illinois
Legislature by finding the legislative intent to create a savings clause in the
preamble of the House bill when the legislation should have clearly expressed
its intent in the text of the bill itself. Id. at 623.
43. See Kohen & Bozorgi, supra note 7, at 34 (recognizing the new
importance of section 414 after the repeal of the Structural Work Act). See
also Genaust v. Ill. Power Co., 343 N.E.2d 465, 468 (Ill. 1976) (applying section
343 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, in an independent contractor

situation). The Genaust court held that "[a] possessor of land owes an invitee
a duty of exercising reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions on his
land." Genaust, 343 N.E.2d at 472. Section 343 provides that a possessor of
land owes a duty of reasonable care to its invitees to protect them from a
dangerous condition or activity on the land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 343 (1965). This duty only arises if the landowner "knows or by the
exercise of reasonable care would discover" the dangerous activity on the land.
However, section 343 does not directly address general
Id. § 343(a).
contractor/subcontractor relationships or "retained control" issues, and is
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The fate of the Illinois Structural Work Act in the most recent
decade can be tied directly to bi-partisan politics. The 1995 repeal
of the Illinois Structural Work Act came immediately after the
Illinois Republican party gained the majority of both the House
and Senate.44 Since 1995, the Democratic Party made numerous
attempts to resurrect the Illinois Structural Work Act.4" On March
27, 2001, the Illinois House passed a bill re-establishing the
Structural Work Act in Illinois."6 However, with a Republican
majority controlling the Illinois Senate, 7 the bill was dead upon
arrival." In the latest elections, Democrat Rod Blagojevich won
the governorship and the Illinois Democratic Party gained
majority status in both the House and Senate. 9 In effect, the
evoked far less frequently than section 414 in construction negligence cases
that would have been litigated under the former Illinois Structural Work Act.
Kohen & Bozorgi, supra note 7, at 34-35. For these reasons section 343 will
not be discussed in this comment. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 311 (1965) (asserting a negligent misrepresentation theory). A very creative
plaintiff may also use section 311 arguing that the competence, quality or
safety
of the work was negligently misrepresented to him. Dennis J. Cotter, Michael
J. McGowan & Morfia J. Komobs, Who is in Control? Defending Construction
Negligence
Claims,
at
http://www.osalaw.com/publications/
DefendingConstructionNegligenceClaims _12.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2003)
(describing the various theories a construction negligence plaintiff may pursue
in his claim). Section 311 appears to be invoked less often than section 343,
and likewise will not be discussed in this article.
44. ILLINOIS SECRETARY OF STATE, 1995-1996 ILL. BLUE BOOK 64 (1996)
(revealing the composition of the 89th General Assembly to be 64 Republican
seats to 54 Democratic seats).
45. H.B. 210, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Il1. 1999) (proposing a new
Illinois Structural Work Act sponsored by Tom Dart (Democrat, Chicago);
subsequently defeated by a Republican controlled Senate). See also In
Springfield, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 19, 1999, at 3 (quoting Representative
Tom Dart, Democrat (Chicago) regarding the importance of his House bill).
Construction-related deaths went up after Illinois dropped the law. We
were one of the safest states in the union years back. We aren't any
more ....

Reinstating the act will send the message that worker safety

should be a top priority for businesses .... Labor groups... must
pressure senators to live up to statements about protecting working men
and women .... Now it's put up or shut up' time[.]
Id.

46. H.B. 158, 92d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2001) (purporting to reestablish the Illinois Structural Work Act-sponsored by Representative
Bradley).
47. Ray Long and Douglas Holt, Lawmakers Brace for Rocky Ride on
Remap, 3rd Airport and Alot More, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2001, at 1DN
(revealing the composition of the current Illinois Senate as 32 Republican
seats to 27 Democrat seats).
48. Illinois Association of Chamber and Commerce Executives: 2001
Legislative Agenda Mid-Session Review, available at http://www.iacce.org/
news-resources/pdf/sess.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). The bill narrowly
passed the House, with a minimum 60-vote majority. Id.
49. See Ray Long & James Janega, Illinois Democrats Unified-For Now,
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political and legislative conditions present for the repeal of the
Structural Work Act in 1995 have entirely reversed, and many
view the re-enactment of the Structural Work Act as a very real
possibility for the 2003 legislative calendar."
The following sections will provide an in-depth analysis of the
effectiveness of both the Structural Work Act and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 414 as reliable and predictable measures of
liability.
II.

THE ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK ACT AND

§ 414:

ANALYSIS OF

LITIGATION PROBLEMS

Part A addresses the operation of the Illinois Structural Work
Act. This section will explore the common litigation problems
arising out of the Act, focusing on the: Structural Work Act's
"willfulness" standard, the protected class, the "having control of'
clause, and the role of comparative negligence. Part B addresses
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, detailing litigation
concerns with a particular emphasis on the "retained control"
clause and the role of comparative negligence.
A. The Illinois Structural Work Act
Prior to its repeal, the Illinois Structural Work Act served as
a seminal construction safety statute, while also providing the
primary civil remedy for workers who suffered constructionrelated injuries." The Structural Work Act remained valid law in
Illinois for some eighty-eight years,52 an indication that the Act
served a valid purpose and had its relative strengths. However,
an analysis of case law litigated under the Structural Work Act
reveals several flaws. This section will explore the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the Act.
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2002, at 1 (detailing Illinois' latest election results).
50. See Jim Sonnenberg, Firms Are Wary of Incoming Guy, CRAIN'S CHI.
BUSINESS, Jan. 13, 2003, at SB6 (explaining the business community's fear
that recent election results would lead to the re-enactment of the Structural
Work Act). But see Editorial, Blagojevich Getting Less Bold On Scaffolding

Act Issue, THE STATE J.-REG., July 28, 2002 at 15 (comparing Blagojevich's
early campaign promise to bring back the Structural Work Act "with one
stroke of a pen," to later and more reserved statements like, "[l]et's see what
the bill is before I agree to summarily sign it.").
51. See Kohen & Bozorgi, supra note 7, at 34 (detailing the history of
remedies available for construction-related injuries in Illinois). See also
Bokodi, 728 N.E.2d at 731 (explaining the historical relationship between the
Illinois Structural Work Act and section 414). The Bokodi court recognized
section 414 as replacing the Structural Work Act as the primary construction
negligence measure in Illinois. Id.
52. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 (1994) (repealed 1995) (indicating the
starting effective date for the Structural Work Act as 1907). But see
Structural Work Act - Repeal, Feb. 14, 1995, IL. PUB. ACT 89-2 (repealing the
Structural Work Act).
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1. The Illinois Structural Work Act: The "Willfulness" requirement
Courts required the injured party to prove a "willful" violation
to proceed with a cause of action under the Structural Work Act.53
The willfulness requirement was a flaw in the Illinois Structural
Work Act, because the term willful, as applied in the Act, departed
from the term's traditional legal meaning. The Illinois Supreme
Court adequately summarized its position by saying, "[allthough
the word 'willful' appears in the statute, the courts have not
construed that word in its ordinary sense."54 In other words, a
willful violation of the Illinois Structural Work Act did not require
a reckless, wanton or deliberate disregard for the Act's
provisions." The Illinois Supreme Court held that a defendant
could willfully violate the Act without even being present on the
worksite." Essentially, a willful violation of the Act occurred when
one who exercised control over the work knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known of the existence of a
dangerous workplace condition.5 7 Any revised statute should only
use a well-established statutory term, like willful, if it intends
upon using that term in a consistent manner. However, the
ambiguity regarding the Structural Work Act's willful requirement
was not the Act's only flaw.

53. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/9 (1994) (repealed 1995) (assessing
liability for "willful violations" or a "willful failure to comply" with the Act's
provisions); see also Rodgers, 623 N.E.2d at 804 (recognizing a willful violation
as an element of a Structural Work Act cause of action).
54. Davis, 336 N.E.2d at 885; ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D,
Civil, No. 180.01 (1971) (defining a "willful" violation under the Structural
Work Act as "a person having charge of the work knew, or in the exercise of
ordinary care, could have known of a dangerous condition.")
55. See generally Gundich v. Emerson-Comstock Co., 171 N.E.2d 60, 67 (Ill.
1960); Oldham v. Kubinski, 185 N.E.2d 270, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962).
56. See Cockrum, 645 N.E.2d at 921-22 (holding that liability can be
assessed on a defendant unaware of a plaintiffs presence on the jobsite, if that
In
defendant should have known that the plaintiff would be present).
Cockrum, the defendant (general contractor) was charged with constructive
knowledge of plaintiffs (sub-contractor employee) presence on jobsite due to
his control of security and jobsite access. Id. But see Getz, 349 N.E.2d at 68788 (holding that a defendant cannot violate the Act if the dangerous condition
is of recent creation). In Getz, the court reasoned that the defendant, the
general contractor on the construction site, could not have reasonably
discovered the existence of unsafe work practices concerning a scaffold, and
therefore could not be held liable for the damages incurred. Id. at 688. See
also Smith v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Ser. Co., 531 N.E.2d 51, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that the defendant, owner of a power plant, could not have reasonably
known about an icy scaffold). In Smith, the dangerous condition materialized
during a lunch break and the court reasoned that the defendant could not
therefore be held liable for the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at 58.
57. See generally Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 150 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ill. 1958);
Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 106 N.E. 236, 240 (Ill. 1914).
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2. The Illinois Structural Work Act: The Protected Class
Another flaw in the Illinois Structural Work Act was the
controversy over establishing the Act's protected class. Despite
Illinois courts' willingness to "liberally construe" the provisions of
the Structural Work Act, there was little argument over the fact
that the Act did not cover all construction-related accidents.58
Section 1 of the Act expressly limited the scope of coverage to those
injuries arising out of the activities of "erection, repairing,
alteration, removal or painting," that were due to a failure in
"scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other
mechanical contrivances." 9 Despite these express provisions,
Illinois courts chose to unnecessarily extend the scope of the
"protected class" under the Act.
First, Illinois courts extended coverage to a plaintiff who is
not employed on the worksite, if that plaintiff could establish a
legitimate connection to that worksite. ° This destroyed the
predictability and reliability of the Act, as coverage was extended
or denied in a seemingly arbitrary manner.61 For example, a
building inspector injured during an inspection was allowed to
bring suit under the Act" while a court denied coverage of a
firefighter injured during the administration of medical assistance

58. See Bezan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 636 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) (holding that while liberally constructed, the Illinois Structural
Work Act does not provide protection to all construction activities). Protection
under the Structural Work Act is limited to extra-hazardous activities. Id. at
1083. See also Rogers, 623 N.E.2d at 805 (stating that the Structural Work
Act was never intended to cover all activities. and hazards associated with
construction).
59. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 § 1 (1994) (repealed 1995).
60. See Bennett v. Musgrave, 266 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ill. 1970) (holding that a
jobsite volunteer, injured while on that jobsite, was covered under the act).
The plaintiff in Bennett had been inspecting the construction site at the
request of the defendant, and was therefore engaged in a construction activity
allowing for coverage under of the Act. Id. at 131. But see Kelly v. Northwest
Cmty. Hosp., 384 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ill. 1978) (holding that a plaintiff, who had
voluntarily entered the jobsite and subsequently died, was not covered under
the Structural Work Act). In Kelly, the court reasoned that the plaintiff,
present on a jobsite but without a legitimate, construction-related purpose
should not be extended coverage under the Act. Id. at 105. See also Long v.
City of New Boston, 440 N.E.2d 625, 631 (Ill. 1982) (denying coverage to a
volunteer plaintiff, injured while stringing Christmas lights on utility poles).
The court in Long reasoned that the plaintiffs activities could not be regarded
as an "erection" of a structure under section 1 of the Illinois Structural Work
Act, as the plaintiff had argued. Id. at 631.
61. See Reed, supra note 16, at 187 (arguing that no discernable pattern
can be found regarding the interpretation of the "protected class" in Illinois
construction negligence case law).
62. See, e.g., Quinn, 418 N.E.2d at 1013 (extending coverage to a citybuilding instructor because of his "vital role in the construction process").
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to a construction worker.63 Both plaintiffs were municipal workers
injured on worksites in the furtherance of their job duties and yet
the court allowed coverage of one plaintiff under the Act.64 Also,
this liberal interpretation was unnecessary because it did not
further the purpose of the Act, which is to ensure workplace safety
for construction workers engaged in extra-hazardous activities."
Illinois courts further complicated the protected class issue by
extending coverage to construction employee plaintiffs not engaged
in extra-hazardous activities, if they could prove that their
activities were integral to the assistance or furtherance of section
1 activities.66 This extension of coverage would prove a dubious
rationale.67
For instance, courts allowed coverage for a
boilermaker who was killed while unloading pedestals from a
railcar because his activities were "integral" to the erection of air
heaters.66
A plaintiff who delivered a propane tank to a
construction site was also covered under the Act for injuries that
occurred when the plaintiff fell a matter of inches from a wooden
plank that had been placed over muddy ground.66 Again, the court
63. See, e.g., Grant, 440 N.E.2d at 1045 (denying coverage under the Act to
a firefighter injured while rescuing a construction worker). The court
reasoned that the administration of medical aid does not constitute a direct
connection to the construction process. Id.
64. See generally Quinn, 418 N.E.2d at 1013; Grant, 440 N.E.2d at 1045.
65. See Rogers, 623 N.E.2d at 805 (defining the purposes of the Act as
"provid[ing] protection to the workers engaged in work activities of a
particularly hazardous nature.").
66. See Reed, supra note 16, at 188-90 (explaining the "integral relation"
requirement).
67. See id. at 190 (arguing that "[tihe difficulty with the Act is not in the
language which limits its coverage, but with the analysis used by the courts in
interpreting that language."). Reed believes that there exists no clear rule
upon which the courts base their decisions. Id.
68. McNellis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 317 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ill. 1974). In
McNellis, the plaintiff was unloading component parts for an air heater from a
railcar and suffered fatal injuries when pinned to the side of a rail car by a
pedestal that unexpectedly fell. Id. at 575. In finding coverage under the Act,
the court reasoned that the general task of erecting a steam-generating unit
necessitates the incidental task of unloading component parts. Id. In a
spirited dissent, Justice Ryan argued that this extension of coverage was
contrary to the purpose of the Act, and was without textual support, as the
plaintiffs activities were not addressed in section 1 of the Act. Id. at 576-77
(Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan also embraced the constitutional defense
raised by the defendants, stating that an extension of coverage to the plaintiff
would create an arbitrary classification. Id.
69. Ashley v. Osman & Ass'n, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983). In Ashley, muddy conditions necessitated the delivery of materials and
equipment from storage buildings to the actual construction site. Id. at 1012.
In delivering the materials and equipment, the workmen walked over wooden
planks and concrete forms to prevent them from sinking into the deep mud.
Id. The plaintiff suffered severe muscle and nerve damage after a plank
slipped out from underneath him and the propane tank he carried fell on top
of him. Id. In finding coverage, the court reasoned that the plaintiff as a
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reasoned that delivery of materials was an integral part of their
construction, a section 1 activity.7 °
However, Illinois courts did not provide coverage to all
plaintiffs injured in the delivery of materials to be used in the
erection of a structure.' An ironworker injured by slipping off a
tractor during the process of transferring structural steel to a
construction site was denied coverage under the Act." Much like
the "legitimate connection" extension to the non-employee
plaintiff, these decisions are difficult to compromise and indicate
an absence of reliability. 3 Moreover, one Illinois Supreme Court
justice suggested that these applications of the Structural Work
Act represented a constitutionality issue as arbitrary
classifications. 4 It is also important to note that at the time of
injury, none of these employees were engaged in extra-hazardous
activities, and providing for their protection under the Structural
Work Act failed to advance the Act's purpose of ensuring adequate
safety and compensation to construction employees directly
engaged in extra-hazardous activities.'
A revised safety statute and civil remedy must provide more
guidance in determining the protected class, while anticipating
roofer (his normal duties) and the plaintiff as a deliverer (not normal duties,
but necessitated by muddy conditions) could not be separated. Id. at 1216.
Therefore, the court found that the plaintiffs delivery of materials and
equipment to the construction site were an integral part of his extrahazardous roofing duties and should be covered under the Structural Work
Act. Id.
70. Id.
71. See generally Crafton v. Lester B. Knight & Assoc., Inc., 263 N.E.2d
817, 819 (Ill. 1970).
72. Id. In Crafton, the plaintiff was assisting in the loading of a tractor
with structural steel to be hauled to a construction site. Id. at 818. The
plaintiff was injured when a combination of muddy conditions and premature
acceleration of the tractor caused him to slip off the back and fall to the
ground. Id. In denying coverage, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the
Structural Work Act's "plain meaning" to find that the plaintiffs activities
were not intended to be covered under section 1. Id.
73. See Reed, supra note 16, at 188-90 (asserting the unpredictability of the
protected class acts to discourage settlements where coverage is an issue).
74. McNellis, 317 N.E.2d at 576-77 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan
argued that the danger the plaintiff was exposed to was a danger inherent in
the unloading of materials from a railcar, and not a danger peculiar to extrahazardous work. Id. at 577. Next, Ryan reasoned that the classification was
based upon the particular purpose for which the unloaded materials were to be
used. Id. Ryan contends that this classification is arbitrary and bears no
reasonable relation to the true legislative intent, protecting extra-hazardous
construction activities. Id. Ryan argues that the danger faced by the plaintiff
is routinely faced on construction sites and that it is unfair to extend coverage
to a plaintiff unloading materials for the purpose of "installation," and denying
coverage to a plaintiff unloading materials for another purpose, when the
dangers they face are identical. Id.
75. See generally Rogers, 623 N.E.2d at 805.
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problematic concerns regarding employees and non-employees,
with a particular emphasis on municipal workers, volunteers, nonhazardous construction occupations and passer-bys. While the
protected class was often challenging, the Structural Work Act did
prove reliable in other aspects. Litigation proceeding under the
Structural Work Act benefited from a clear set of factors to
determine the "having control of' clause."6
3. The Illinois Structural Work Act: The "HavingControl of"
Clause.
Liability under the Illinois Structural Work Act was limited
to those persons or entities having charge of the work.77 The
Illinois courts failed to provide a conclusive or bright-line test for
interpreting the having charge of clause throughout the operation
of the Structural Work Act. 8 However, the Illinois Supreme Court
cited with approval ten relevant factors that may be used to
determine whether a defendant was in charge of work. 9 These
factors provided an adequate frame upon which a lawyer could
base discovery inquiries and formulate trial strategies. These
factors indicate that having charge of is not limited to custody,
restraint or direct control, and can be ascertained only by
surveying the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
accident."
It is of paramount importance that any revised safety statute
containing a "control" clause, include relevant factors that provide
lawyers and courts with a more tangible grasp on what
76. See generally Simmons, 473 N.E.2d at 949-50; Chance v. City of
Collinsville, 445 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
77. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/9 (1994) (repealed 1995); Quinn, 418 N.E.2d
at 1013. The Quinn court held that that coverage under the Structural Work
Act could be extended to non-employees who were sufficiently involved in the
construction process; see generally Angler, supra note 16.
78. See Larson, 211 N.E.2d at 251 (recognizing the clause "having charge
of' as a generic term of broad import).
79. Simmons, 473 N.E.2d at 949-50 (citing Chance, 445 N.E.2d at 42).
Chance states that the ten relevant factors are:
(1) [S]upervision and control of the work; (2) retention of the right to
supervise and control the work; (3) constant participation in ongoing
activities at the construction site; (4) supervision and coordination of
subcontractors; (5) responsibility for taking safety precautions at the
jobsite; (6) authority to issue change orders; and (7) right to stop the
work ....
(8) ownership of the equipment at the jobsite; (9) defendant's
familiarity with construction customs and practices; and (10) whether d
efendant was in a position to assure worker safety or alleviate
equipment deficiencies or improper work habits.
Chance, 445 N.E.2d at 42.
80. See Simmons, 473 N.E.2d at 949 (defining "having charge of' as a
factual question involving numerous factors). The Rodgers court cited the 10
relevant factors, previously endorsed by the Illinois Supreme Court, as the
basis of their determination of the control issue. Rodgers, 623 N.E.2d at 804.
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actionable

behavior. A clear set of factors improves the reliability of a
measure and the efficiency of trial procedure. Any revised safety
statute must also consider the role of comparative negligence in a
plaintiffs tort recovery.
4. The Illinois Structural Work Act: The Role of Comparative
Negligence
In the landmark Illinois case, Simmons v. Union Electric Co.,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the principles of comparative
fault were not applicable to a plaintiff proceeding under the
Structural Work Act.81 The Simmons court relied upon the Illinois
General Assembly's intent and strict rules of statutory
construction in reaching their decision." The Simmons decision
was valid law until the repeal of the Structural Work Act.83
Simmons sparked the most controversy concerning the
Structural Work Act, and any revised Structural Work Act must
first determine if the doctrine of comparative negligence is in fact
inconsistent with the purposes of a safety statute. While the nonavailability of comparative negligence created no litigation
problems, the policy behind the decision was commonly critiqued.
The unavailability of the comparative fault defense under the
Structural Work Act was routinely attacked by the Illinois defense
bar, the insurance community84 and the Republican Party, all
citing inequitable decisions85 and claiming undue economic
81. See Simmons, 473 N.E.2d at 953 (holding that in order to effectuate the
intent of the General Assembly, an injured worker's recovery under the
Structural Work Act should not be reduced by his own fault). The Simmons
court stated that "[t]he sole inquiry under the Act is an assessment of the
defendant's culpability and not the plaintiffs conduct." Id. See also Gardner,
supra note 35, at 235-39 (discussing the ramifications of the Simmons decision
in Illinois case law). Gardner argues that the Illinois Supreme Court erred in
Simmons by not extending the comparative negligence doctrine to Structural
Work Act cases. Id.
82. Simmons, 473 N.E.2d at 953-54.
83. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/9 (1994) (repealed 1995).
84. Work Act Repealed, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1995, at 18 (quoting Timothy J.
Conlon, an insurance professional).
I applaud the efforts of the Illinois General Assembly to vote for its
(Structural Work Act) repeal .... The Structural Work Act favors only
select skilled workers and not all trades or unions .... It encourages

unsafe work practices of individual carelessness by making the
"plaintiff' free of any comparative fault .... The Structural Work Act
has been an enormous financial burden to Illinois business due to higher
construction costs and higher insurance premiums .... Construction in

our state has been stifled.
Id.
85. See Carlton v. Verplaetse, 458 N.E.2d 584, 586-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(holding that the plaintiffs disregard of a direct order to stop working did not
serve as a bar to his recovery under the Structural Work Act); Basden v.
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hardship.86 To no surprise, the Republican-controlled Illinois
House and Senate repealed the Act in 1995."' The Illinois plaintiff
bar, labor unions, the Democratic Party, and the workers
themselves praised the liberal construction of the Act, and argued
that the lack of comparative negligence helped ensure workplace
safety by allowing an injured plaintiff to bring suit against any
negligent party, with the exception of their immediate employer.88
A revised Structural Work Act should attempt to bridge the gap
between these parties and present a compromised approach,
ensuring both adequate safety and recompense while alleviating
economic hardships. Much like the Structural Work Act, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 414 has evoked both praise and
dissatisfaction.
B. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 414
Common law negligence principles governing constructionrelated injuries, expressed in section 414, both co-existed with the
Structural Work Act and survived its repeal. 9 The Illinois
Supreme Court first recognized section 414 as valid Illinois law in
1965. 90 Currently, section 414, "[a] first cousin of the Illinois
Structural Work Act," is the strongest negligence theory under
which to pursue damages in construction-related injuries." Like
Kiefner Bros., 414 N.E.2d 951, 957-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that
plaintiff's lack of experience in carpentry was not relevant and was barred as
an improper introduction of comparative negligence).
86. Illinois Manufacturer's Association: IMA Legislative report, at
http://www.ima-net.org/publications/highlights/sphlts02l5Ol.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003). This site presents the argument typified by the Illinois
business community, that the Structural Work Act stunted economic growth
and deprived the State in its ability to attract new businesses by forcing
employers to defend both Workers' Compensation and Structural Work Act
claims. Id.
87. H.B. 30, 82nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1995). See also State
Legislature Can Repeal Remedial Acts After All, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 30,
1999, at 5 (discussing the repeal of the Structural Work Act by the newly
elected Republican majority).
88. Workplace Safety: The Structural Work Act Repeal, at http://www.ilaflcio.org/SAFETY.HTM (last visited Feb. 23, 2003) (arguing that the Structural
Work Act ensured safety by allowing injured workers to bring suit against any
negligent party, with the exception of their immediate employer). This site
further contends that the Structural Work Act did not damage Illinois
business interests, as the Illinois construction injury grew at seven times the
national rate while the Structural Work Act was in place. Id.
89. See Bokodi, 728 N.E.2d at 731 (discussing historical relationship
between the Structural Work Act and section 414). The Bokodi court details
the co-existence of both measures, though recognizing that prior to the repeal,
the Structural Work Act was the primary civil remedy for construction-related
injuries. Id.
90. See Larson, 211 N.E.2d at 252-53 (holding that the retention of a right
to control work subjects one to duty and liability under valid common law).
91. Kohen & Bozorgi, supra note 7, at 34. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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the Structural Work Act, an analysis of litigation arising under
section 414 is a good indication of the utility and reliability of the
Restatement Approach. This section will focus on two important
aspects of section 414, the retained control clause, and the role of
comparative negligence.
1. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 414: "Retained Control" Clause
The general rule under which section 414 litigation is tried is
simple. The section explains that a person who retains the control
of any part of the work of an independent contractor, who that
person hired, is subject to liability for any physical harm to others
that occurs.92 Unfortunately, Illinois courts operate without a list
of relevant factors in determining retained control, as they did
with the having control of clause of the Structural Work Act.
However, it is openly accepted that the reservation of a general
right of supervision is not sufficient to prove retained control.93 On
the other hand, the power to forbid work from being done in an
unsafe manner is almost conclusive evidence of the type of
retained power necessary to incur liability. 94
Current litigation concerns surrounding section 414 focuses
on the aspects of work the defendant must actually retain control
over to trigger liability." The emergence of a split between the
OF TORTS § 343 (1965) (defining common law premises liability, another theory
under which to seek damages for construction-related injuries). This theory,
however, is evoked far less frequently than section 414. Kohen & Bozorgi,
supra note 7, at 35.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965). The section states
that:
lo]ne who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains
the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical
harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise
reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control
with reasonable care.
Id.
93. See Rangel v. Brookhaven Constructors, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999) (holding that the defendant's right of supervision, in the
absence of any further right over the operative details of plaintiffs work, was
not sufficient to meet the retained control clause). The Rangel court reasoned
that the subcontractors were entirely free to control the means and methods of
their own work. Id. at 177-78. Further, the injury occurred on a scaffold
provided by the subcontractor, who was also responsible for the unsafe method
of performing the work. Id. at 177. Finally, this unsafe method of work was
proposed to the plaintiff a few hours before the accident occurred, which the
court found to be too restrictive a time period to charge the defendant with
constructive notice. Id.
94. See generally Schoenbeck v. DuPage Water Comm'n, 607 N.E.2d 693,
698-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Ryan v. Mobil Oil Corp., 510 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (citing Pasko v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 302 N.E.2d 642,
648 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)).
95. See Kohen & Bozorgi, supra note 7, at 36 (explaining the split in
reasoning between the first and third district appellate courts, while siding
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First and Third District Appellate Courts further complicates
matters. 96 First District Appellate Court cases hold that the
defendant must only retain control over unsafe job conditions and
work practices, and is most consistent with the requirements of
the Structural Work Act. 7 However, Third District Appellate
Court cases have raised the bar, requiring that the defendant
control the means and methods or the operative details of the
plaintiffs work.98 These fundamental differences diminish the
with the reasoning of the majority, the first district appellate court).
96. See id. (arguing that the reasoning of the third district, which requires
the defendant to retain control over the operative details of the plaintiffs
work, is too dogmatic and that only the plaintiffs employer alone could
possibly satisfy this strict requirement). Kohen and Bozorgi argue that this
interpretation of section 414, renders the law forceless. Id.
97. See Bokodi, 728 N.E.2d at 735 (holding that defendant who went to
great lengths to control workplace safety standards retained control over the
plaintiffs work). In Bokodi, the defendant (general contractor) retained the
right to monitor weekly safety meetings, determine appropriate protective
equipment and work clothes, and order the plaintiffs work to be stopped. Id.
The defendant also employed a full-time safety manager to conduct safety
meetings and check the jobsite for safety compliance. Id. For these reasons,
the court found that the defendant had "retained control" over the plaintiffs
work. Id. See also Claudy, 524 N.E.2d at 998 (holding that a defendant need
only exercise control over any part of an independent contractor's work to
satisfy the "retained control" clause). The defendant in Claudy, a city that
hired a subcontractor for tree removal, was held to have retained control over
the plaintiffs work. Id. at 995. The control issue was established through
evidence of routine visits to worksites, a retention of the right to stop work,
and the ability to fire personnel not complying with safety standards. Id. See
also Weber, 295 N.E.2d at 51 (holding that defendant "retained control" over
plaintiffs work by retaining the right to stop work and the ability to order
unsafe or inadequate equipment removed). The defendant in Weber retained
the power to forbid and stop work, the right of supervision and the right to
remove a workman considered unfit or unskilled. Id. The Weber court
satisfied the "retained control" clause by a finding that the plaintiff was not
entirely free to perform his work in his own way. Id. at 50. See also Pasko,
302 N.E.2d at 649 (holding that a defendant who employed a jobsite inspector
that knew the plaintiff was using inadequate equipment "retained control"
over the plaintiff's work). In Pasko, the defendant had employed a jobsite
inspector who visited the jobsite twice daily and was present during the
excavation. Id. at 648. That inspector admitted to having actual knowledge of
the plaintiffs inadequate equipment, and his failure to correct known
equipment deficiencies was a breach of a duty of reasonable care. Id.
98. See Fris v. Personal Prod. Co., 627 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (holding that the defendant's general authority over the construction
activities of the plaintiff was not enough to trigger liability). In Fris, the court
said:
Although Personal Products retained the right to require that work be
done in a safe manner, this general authority cannot be viewed as
creating such a right of supervision as to have prevented Stephen (Subcontractor) from doing routine work in its own way .... It did not

control the routine and incidental aspects of Stephen's work ....
Adoption of Fris' (Plaintiffs's) theory of liability would in effect result in
strict liability for all injuries to employees of independent contractors.
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predictability of section 414 litigation and leave lawyers uncertain
regarding the level of culpability they must establish.
This issue illustrates the main flaw of section 414, its lack of
guidance in determining the retained control clause. Any revised
safety standard should provide relevant factors, and address the
type of work a defendant must retain control over to become liable.
2. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 414: The Role of Comparative
Negligence
The fundamental difference between the Structural Work Act
and section 414 litigation is that under section 414, a plaintiffs
negligent conduct may be introduced into evidence.99 Comparative
negligence is used in construction negligence cases to determine
whether the tortfeasor's obligation to pay damages should be
reduced based upon the plaintiffs own level of negligent conduct. 100
In shaping a new construction safety statute, the role of
comparative negligence cannot be ignored. The function of this
equitable doctrine must be weighed against the purpose of
protecting and adequately compensating the injured workman.
Since the repeal of the Structural Work Act, construction-related
deaths in Illinois have risen twenty-nine percent,10' an indication
that section 414, and its recognition of comparative negligence, did
not adequately ensure workplace safety.
In the following section, this comment will present a new and
revised construction safety statute. This revised statute will
provide an alternative to the shortcomings of the Structural Work
Act, in particular the willfulness requirement and the protected
class, while endorsing the strength of the factors used in
determining the having control of clause and the Act's power as a
deterrent of unsafe workplace conditions. It will also address the
Id.
99. See Kohen & Bozorgi, supra note 7, at 39 (explaining the role of
comparative negligence in construction negligence litigation). Cf. Varilek v.
Mitchell Eng'g Co., 558 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that
evidence was admissible indicating, plaintiffs awareness of slippery
conditions); Alvis, 421 N.E.2d 896-97 (replacing the old doctrine of
contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative negligence as
controlling tort law in Illinois).
100. See Haberer, 511 N.E.2d at 808 (holding that the obviousness of the
danger causing the plaintiffs injury did not bar his recovery, but could be

introduced into evidence to offset his recovery based upon the principles of
comparative negligence); Kohen & Bozorgi, supra note 7, at 46 (explaining

that the open and obvious defense available to defendants under section 343
litigation is not available to defendants under section 414). The defense of
comparative negligence is available to defendants under both sections 343 and

414. Id.
101. Healy, supra note 6 (describing the alarming raise in construction

related deaths in Illinois since the repeal of the Illinois Structural Work Act in
1995 through 1998).
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litigation problems involved in section 414 case law, like the lack
of guidance in determining the retained control clause. Finally,
this revised statute will weigh the policy issues involved in
including or disregarding the doctrine of comparative negligence in
determining a plaintiffs tort recovery.
III. PROPOSAL
Part A briefly introduces a new, revised safety statute
representing departures from both the Structural Work Act and
section 414. Part B addresses the willfulness requirement and the
role of comparative negligence in this revised statute, discussing a
proposed two-prong approach with a modified or compromised
acceptance of comparative negligence. Part C focuses on a much
stricter, plain meaning approach to the protected class issue
proposed under the revised construction safety statute. Finally,
Part D addresses the control issue, and focus on the importance of
developing relevant factors for courts to consider.
A. ProposedSafety Statute
In an effort to ensure adequate protection and compensation
to injured workers without burdening the construction industry
with undue economic hardships, the following proposed statute
provides a measure of liability that represents a more reliable,
predictable, and compromised approach to construction negligence.
The proposed statute is a re-establishment of the previous
Structural Work Act with the following modifications. First, the
revised statute establishes two levels of culpability, a "grossly
negligent" violation and a "negligent" violation. Next, the revised
statute must expressly limit the scope of the protected class to
those employed on the worksite and engaged in extra-hazardous
activities. Further, the revised statute will endorse the ten
relevant factors used in Structural Work Act case law as a basis
for determining the control issue. Finally, the proposed statute
will introduce a compromised approach to comparative negligence,
leaving its applicability up to the nature of the defendant's
violation.
B. Proposed Change to "Willfulness" Requirement & the Role of
Comparative Negligence
Under the previous Structural Work Act, the willfulness
requirement did not require wanton, intentional, reckless or
deliberate conduct. ' A plaintiff need only prove that a defendant,
while retaining control, failed to exercise reasonable care.10 3 It was
102. See ILLINOIS PArIrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D, supra note 54 (defining

the requirements for a willful violation under the Structural Work Act).
103. See generally Schultz, 106 N.E.2d at 240; Kennerly, 150 N.E.2d at 139.
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also well established that a defendant was not able to raise the
defense of4 comparative negligence in an effort to mitigate his own
liability.1
The proposed change to the Structural Work Act's willfulness
requirement establishes two levels of culpability. Violations are
considered as either gross negligence or a lesser level of
culpability, mere negligence, and each word is to be treated
according to their accepted legal connotation. '°' Further, the
proposed statute suggests a compromised, limited acceptance of
comparative negligence.
Under the revised statute, grossly
negligent violations preclude a defendant from raising
comparative negligence as a trial issue. This maintains the prior
Structural Work Act's power as a deterrent, ensuring safe working
conditions by denying the availability of comparative negligence as
a defense." 6 However, a negligent violation under the revised Act
would allow a defendant's liability to be offset by the level of the
plaintiffs own negligent conduct. This will lessen the economic
hardship that the prior Structural Work Act placed on the
construction industry. This is a clear departure from the prior
Structural Work Act, but it represents a compromised approach to
comparative negligence, that does not compromise workplace
safety.
C. ProposedProtected Class
In interpreting the old Structural Work Act, Illinois courts
unnecessarily complicated the Act's protected class by extending
coverage to non-employees, volunteers, and those not explicitly
engaged in extra-hazardous activities." 7 In determining a revised
approach to the protected class it is important to consider the
purpose of the old Act. The purpose of the Illinois Structural Work
Act was to provide adequate protection and compensation to those

104. Simmons, 473 N.E.2d at 953.
105. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (7th ed. 1999) (defining gross
negligence as a "conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a
duty" to another). The aggrieved party may "typically recover exemplary
damages." Id.

See also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW

OF TORTS § 34, 211-12 (5th ed. 1984) (suggesting that most courts consider
gross negligence less severe than a reckless disregard, and differing from
ordinary negligence only in degree, but not necessarily in kind); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1056 (7th ed. 1999) (defining negligence as a "failure to exercise a
standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised"
under the similar circumstances); KEETON, supra § 28, 161 (recognizing
negligence as the dominant cause of action for accidental injury in America).
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965) supra note 36 and
accompanying text (noting the liability of construction-related accidents).
107. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (illustrating how the
Structural Work Act was broadly interpreted by courts to include persons not

covered by the plain language).
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injured in the course of extra-hazardous activities."' In other
words, its purpose was not limited to providing monetary
compensation to the injured worker, but also to deter the practice
of unsafe working conditions altogether." 9 Extending coverage to
non-employees, volunteers, passer-bys or those not engaged in
extra-hazardous activities failed to further the purposes of the Act
and diminished its predictability.
The revised approach limits coverage to jobsite employees
engaged in extra-hazardous activities, as defined in section 1 of
the old Structural Work Act."' Only these specific individuals
should enjoy the benefit of no comparative negligence concerning
grossly negligent violations. Moreover, this approach allows far
less judicial interpretation. Under the old Structural Work Act,
the Illinois Supreme Court routinely supported a liberal
construction of the Act" 1 leading to various and seemingly
arbitrary extensions of the protected class." 2 The revised statute
creates a more reliable and predictable measure of liability by
limiting the protected class to a strict interpretation of section 1
activities performed only by jobsite employees.

108. See Rogers, 623 N.E.2d at 805 (holding that the purpose behind the Act
was to provide adequate protection to those work activities of a particularly
hazardous nature); Larson, 211 N.E.2d at 251 (holding that the legislative
purpose was to provide maximum protection to those engaged in particularly
hazardous construction activities). The Larson court held that the Act should
be liberally construed by courts to ensure this maximum protection. Id.
109. See Davis, 336 N.E.2d at 884 (explaining the relationship between the
various hazards of the construction industry and the purpose of the Illinois
Structural Work Act); Larson, 211 N.E.2d at 251 (holding that to ensure the
maximum protection intended by the legislation, liability extends not only to
those on-site who control construction operations but also to owners and any
other individuals). For example, an architect, exercising direct charge over
construction activities, may be found liable. Id. See Workplace Safety, supra
note 88, at 18 (suggesting that, an injured workman could bring suit against
any negligent party, save his immediate employer, the Structural Work Act
provided a strong incentive for all worksite employers to create a safe working
environment). The Act's power as a deterrent of unsafe working conditions
was also strengthened by the Act's criminal sanctions, a class A misdemeanor,
provided for under section 9. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/9 (1994) (repealed in
1995).
110. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 §1 (1994) (repealed in 1995). Section 1
limits liability to those occupied in the activities of "erection, repairing,
alteration, removal or painting" of a "structure" while engaged on "scaffolds,
hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances." Id.
111. See Davis, 336 N.E.2d at 884 (applying a liberal interpretation of the
Structural Work Act in holding that a negligent crane operator received
coverage under the Act).
112. See supra notes 67-74, and accompanying text (providing examples
where the limiting language of the Structural Work Act was not enough to
prevent courts from extending coverage to people outside the scope of the Act).
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D. Proposed Control Clause
The revised statute retains the same having control principle
in addition to the ten relevant factors established by Illinois courts
for determining liability under the Act."3 This will help avoid the
current litigation problems found in section 414 case law
concerning the type of work courts would require a defendant to
The proposed clause
retain control over to trigger liability."'
approach to the
stricter
rejects the Third District Appellate Court's
control issue as both an impractical and unnecessary deviation
from long recognized principles."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most compelling reason to establish new
legislation regarding construction safety is the fate of the workers
themselves. A twenty-nine percent increase in constructionrelated injuries since the repeal of the Illinois Structural Work Act
is an undeniable statement of ineffectiveness." 6 Ambiguities in
current litigation and overall unpredictability represent a further
need for reform. Since 1995, Illinois has neither secured its
construction workers an adequately safe workplace nor secured a
sufficient civil remedy for workplace deaths and injuries. These
deficiencies can only be resolved through legislative efforts. In an
attempt to bridge the gap between all interested parties and
initiate much needed reform, the proposed construction safety
statute and civil remedy described in this article represent a
compromised approach to this issue.

113. See Larson, 211 N.E.2d at 251 (recognizing the having charge of clause
as being "a generic term of broad import" to the Structural Work Act).
114. See sources cited supra notes, 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing
the difficulties of section 414 litigation). See generally Kohen & Bozorgi, supra
note 7.
115. See Kohen & Bozorgi, supra note 7, at 36-37 (arguing that the third
district appellate court's standard cannot be satisfied by an injured plaintiff,
and is inconsistent with both the view of the first district appellate court and
the case law under the old Structural Work Act).
116. Healy, supra note 6 (describing the alarming rise in construction
related deaths in Illinois since the repeal of the Illinois Structural Work Act in

1995 through 1998).

